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ARTICLE
THE LEGACY OF EXXON VALDEZ:
HOW DO WE STOP THE CRISIS?
AMY J. WILDERMUTH*
Within five hours of running aground on Blight Reef, the Exxon
Valdez spilled over ten million gallons of oil into Prince William Sound.1
Over twenty years later, oil remains,2 and it will likely be there for many,
many more years to come.3 It is remarkable to imagine: Fewer than three
hundred minutes resulted in ecological damage that may never be repaired.
The 2009 University of St. Thomas Law Journal Symposium, Exxon
Valdez Revisited: Rights and Remedies, offered an opportunity to reflect on
the disaster’s lessons in a broader legal framework. The central lesson, one
that permeates almost every discussion of the case, is the failure of the legal
system to afford full relief to those affected by the disaster.4
My objective here, however, is different: I want to dig deeper into the
root causes of why an oil spill of this magnitude occurred; why, in short,
* Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. I would like to thank
the University of St. Thomas Law Journal for hosting an excellent symposium and for their efforts
on this piece; I also thank Eric Freyfogle for his invaluable comments on this piece and for all that
he continues to teach me. All errors remain mine.
1. See SAMUEL K. SKINNER & WILLIAM K. REILLY, THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 9 (1989), http://www.uscg.mil/History/webshipwrecks/ExxonValdez
NRT1989Report.pdf.
2. See Rebecca Luczycki, The State of the Sound, ALASKA MAG., Sept. 2009, at 22, 22;
EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, REPORT ON RECENT LINGERING OIL STUDIES, http://
www.evostc.state.ak.us/universal/documents/LingeringOilReport.pdf.
3. See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Oil Remains: The Persistence, Toxicity, and
Impact of Exxon Valdez Oil, http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Recovery/lingeringoil.cfm (last visited
March 14, 2010) (reporting that the remaining oil will take decades and possibly centuries to
disappear entirely).
4. See, e.g., Doug Rendleman, Common Law Punitive Damages: Something for Everyone?,
7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1, 8 (2010) (“Native Alaskans could not recover for losing their subsistence
culture to the Exxon Valdez oil spill.”); Leo M. Romero, Punishment for Ecological Disasters:
Punitive Damages and/or Criminal Sanctions, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 154, 158 (2010) (“If the total
harm to the environment in an oil spill cannot be correctly valued or compensated under tort law,
punitive damages can no longer be relied on to provide the missing compensation.”) (footnote
omitted); Sanne Knudsen, A Precautionary Tale: Assessing Ecological Damages After The Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 95, 107 (2010) (“Our existing tools for remedying harm
. . . are not enough [to] adequately [remedy] ecological harm.”).
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people misuse nature. It is clear that the environmental statutes and regula-
tions in effect at the time of the disaster fell well short of preventing the all
too-predictable consequence of shipping large amounts of oil through sensi-
tive aquatic ecosystems. There was no comprehensive liability scheme in
place, and even simple measures such as better tanker hull design and li-
censing requirements that would allow for drug and alcohol testing—both
of which may have prevented the Exxon Valdez spill—were not
implemented.5
When it did respond to the Exxon Valdez crisis, Congress enacted the
Oil Pollution Act (OPA).6 That act, however, has yielded mixed results over
its twenty-year history.7
Despite its shortcomings, we might be tempted to chalk the Exxon
Valdez disaster to unique circumstances—an accident that will never hap-
pen again because we now have at least some legal regime in place that
governs oil carriers and their liability. We could, in other words, assume all
is well. I believe, however, the Exxon Valdez spill illustrates a far deeper
problem with environmental law and our approach to the environment in
this country, a problem that continues to this day.
Federal environmental law has remained largely unchanged in its ap-
proach and coverage for almost four decades now. It separates the environ-
ment into discrete pieces and has rarely developed anything more than a
triage approach to environmental problems. As many have suggested, we
are long overdue for a new and different legal approach.
But before we begin to design new solutions and write new environ-
mental laws, we need to take another step: we need to explore the root
causes of environmental degradation. We need to consider why (1) a tanker
holding (2) fifty-three million gallons of (3) oil was in (4) Prince William
Sound on that fateful day in 1989.
I begin with lessons from some of the best-known conservation writ-
ers, including environmental historians and environmental economists, in
the hope of getting to the bottom of what has caused our environmental
predicament. I then turn to how these root causes have shaped current envi-
ronmental law and the flaws that we see in them. I conclude with some
suggestions for how, in light of these lessons, we might edge closer to the
next generation of environmental law.
5. See 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.37A (Win-
ter Supp. 2009).
6. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006).
7. See infra note 147.
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I. ROOT CAUSES OF OUR CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL PREDICAMENT
When god-like Odysseus returned from the wars in Troy, he
hanged all on one rope a dozen slave-girls of his household whom
he suspected of misbehavior during his absence.
This hanging involved no question of propriety. The girls
were property. The disposal of property was then, as now, a mat-
ter of expediency, not of right and wrong.8
These opening sentences from environmental giant Aldo Leopold’s
oft-quoted “The Land Ethic” are later extended to the relationship between
humans and land: “There is as yet no ethic dealing with man’s relation to
land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it. Land, like Odys-
seus’ slave-girls, is still property. The land-relation is still strictly economic,
entailing privileges but not obligations.”9 After adding to this a recognition
of our collective ignorance regarding nature, Leopold prescribes a solution
to our problem: we must come to see ourselves as members of a community
that includes soil, waters, plants, and animals, or what he refers to collec-
tively as “the land.”10 “Conservation,” he tells us, “is getting nowhere be-
cause it is incompatible with our Abrahamic concept of land. We abuse land
because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see land as
a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and
respect.”11
This is a harsh indictment, but we can clearly see that the Exxon
Valdez disaster, albeit involving the seas, is consistent with Leopold’s tough
words. A tanker was sent into sensitive waters, home to thousands of
aquatic species, to quench our thirst for oil. But few among us truly ques-
tion this thirst for oil.
As Leopold further explains, “There are two spiritual dangers in not
owning a farm. One is the danger of supposing that breakfast comes from
the grocery, and the other that heat comes from the furnace.”12 We could
add to these another danger: thinking that gas comes from the pump at the
gas station. In the course of swiping our card and twisting the cap off of our
gas tank, do we ever imagine the long journey of that gas and the many
ecosystems disrupted during that journey to the pump? Do we consider the
environmental havoc that the process of oil pumping, refining, and burning
wreaks?13 Most of us worry more about whether gas is cheaper at the gas
8. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 201
(1949).
9. Id. at 203.
10. Id. at 204.
11. Id. at viii.
12. Id. at 6.
13. David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty Input Limits, 33 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 71 (2009).
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station down the street than either of these questions. Why is this? And
what can we do?
To Leopold, the answer is not to ask the government to fix it or to pay
us to make better choices.14 In order to solve our environmental problems,
Leopold tells us that we can no longer let today’s economics dictate all land
use decisions; the only remedy is “[a]n ethical obligation”15—an obligation
that Leopold’s later writings explain should focus on an overall conserva-
tion vision that he called land health.16
In short, although writing long before the rise of McDonald’s, Wal-
Mart, and iPhones, Leopold points the finger squarely at us. It is our system
of economics and the culture that system of economics has bred, Leopold
argues, that is the root cause of our environmental woes.
Although Leopold painted with broad strokes, others have filled in
more details. Donald Worster, Herman Daly, J.R. McNeill, David
Ehrenfeld, and Eric Freyfogle are among them.
A. It All Starts with Economics
Historian Donald Worster, like Leopold, argues that the “most impor-
tant roots of the modern environmental crisis lie not in any particular tech-
nology of production or health care . . . but rather in modern culture
itself.”17 He then explains, “Let us call this modern culture by a simple
name but think of it as a complex phenomenon: The worldview of material-
ism. It has two parts, economic and scientific, so intertwined and interde-
pendent that even now historians have not fully probed their intellectual
linkage.”18 Unlike many who assume that the roots of this culture shift be-
gan relatively recently, Worster traces this change back many centuries, to
as early as the seventeenth century in fact, after “a long spawning period.”19
The change in thought that occurred can be traced, in Worster’s view, to
three causes.
First, there was a massive global transformation from a religious out-
look to secularism. According to Worster, “This secularized culture came to
supersede not only Judeo-Christianity but almost all the other traditional
religious and ethical systems of the world—not entirely but enough to make
14. Id. at 213–14.
15. LEOPOLD, supra note 8, at 214.
16. See id.; see also Aldo Leopold, The Land-Health Concept and Conservation, in FOR THE
HEALTH OF THE LAND 219, 219 (J. Baird Callicott & Eric T. Freyfogle eds., 1999); Amy J. Wil-
dermuth, Eco-Pragmatism and Ecology: What’s Leopold Got to Do With It?, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1145, 1152–54 (2003).
17. Donald Worster, The Wealth of Nature, in THE NEW AGRARIANISM 161, 167 (Eric T.
Freyfogle ed., 2001).
18. Id.
19. See id.
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them secondary, marginal influences.”20 The result was less focus on the
afterlife and much more emphasis on this life.
Second, there was a new progressive impulse. Instead of abiding by
years of tradition, people sought to “escap[e] the patterns of the past.”21 As
a result, “[W]e think of progress mainly as an endless economic or techno-
logical improvement on the present.”22
Finally, there was the advent of rationalism, which, Worster explains,
“was supposed to take the place of authority or spiritual revelation.”23 Ra-
tionalism encouraged people—ordinary people—to use reason to discover
the laws of nature.24 It then encouraged them to use these newly discovered
laws of nature to act in their own self-interest.25
In combination, these three elements—secularism, progressivism, and
rationalism—led to the new worldview of materialism. Although this shift
did not happen overnight or result from a single person, Worster notes that
“this new world-view . . . stole onto the European scene” and was later
carried to places far and wide as Europeans invaded other continents.26
What it wrought was, importantly, a significant impact on the environ-
ment. Worster argues, “[T]he view that improving one’s physical condi-
tion—i.e., achieving more comfort, more bodily pleasure, and especially a
higher level of affluence—is the greatest good, greater than securing the
salvation of one’s soul, greater than learning reverence for nature or God”27
has dramatically changed landscapes and ultimately led to our current eco-
logical crisis. Indeed, Worster concludes, “The human economy requires for
its longterm success that its architects acknowledge their dependence on the
greater economy of nature, preserving its health, and respecting its benefits.
By this standard, every modern economy . . . is an unmitigated disaster.”28
The economist Herman Daly echoes Worster’s last point, but puts it in
more stark terms: “Growth is widely thought to be the panacea for all major
economic ills of the modern world. . . . [But w]hen the economy’s expan-
sion encroaches too much on its surrounding ecosystem, we will begin to
sacrifice natural capital.”29 For Daly, the key is recognizing that there are
limits to nature, limits to the biophysical world.30 “The facts are plain and
uncontestable: the biosphere is finite, nongrowing, closed (except for the
constant input of solar energy), and constrained by the laws of thermody-
20. Id. at 168.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Worster, supra note 17, at 168–69.
24. Id. at 169.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 170.
27. Id. at 167.
28. Id. at 217.
29. Herman E. Daly, Economics in a Full World, SCI. AM., Sept. 2005, at 100, 100.
30. See id. at 100–02.
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namics.”31 When we do not take into account these limits and therefore
build an economy that is ever-growing instead of one at the appropriate
scale, we are bound for disaster.32
There are those, to be sure, who criticize the notion that our current
economic model must change. For example, Ted Nordhaus and Michael
Shellenberger have insisted that we can have it all; we can meet our ecolog-
ical goals and prosper. They argue that environmentalists “have tended to
view economic growth as the cause but not the solution to ecological crisis.
Environmentalists like to emphasize the ways in which the economy de-
pends on ecology, but they often miss the ways in which thinking ecologi-
cally depends on prospering economically.”33 We should, Nordhaus and
Shellenberger urge, “swim with, not against, the currents of changing social
values.”34
But as Jackson Lears recently explained, these arguments “assum[e],
quite falsely, that these developments[, brought about by our materialism
and consumerism,] simply express consumer desire.”35 That is, they ignore
entirely the longer history at play, the slanted economics of perpetual
growth that is simply unsustainable.
Moreover, the idea that we must consume more in order to be happy is
simply untrue. As Daly explains, there is an income level of “sufficiency,”
beyond which only relative position matters.36 In other words, people need
to have a certain minimum amount of wealth to be happy. Beyond that, only
when you gain relative to others are you happier.37 Growth, moreover, does
not mean that everyone will increase their relative wealth; indeed, if every-
one gains proportionally, no one’s relative wealth would increase and thus
no one will be happier.38
Daly estimates that wealthy countries like the United States have
reached a level beyond sufficiency. He is also careful to note, however, that
“[t]his does not mean that the consumer society has died—just that increas-
ing consumption beyond the sufficiency threshold, whether fueled by ag-
gressive advertising or innate acquisitiveness, is simply not making people
happy, in their own estimation.”39
31. Id. at 102.
32. See id. at 107; see also HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUS-
TAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 50–51 (1996) (explaining the earth’s natural limit as akin to a Plimsoll
line: “Optimally loaded boats will still sink under too much weight—even though they may sink
optimally.”).
33. TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH OF
ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 6 (2007).
34. Id.
35. Jackson Lears, The Usefulness of Cranks, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 30, 2009, at 2, http:/
/www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/the-usefulness-cranks-1?page=0,0.
36. Daly, supra note 29, at 107.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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When we think again about the Exxon Valdez disaster, it is helpful to
consider how our economic system drove the decisions made by Exxon.
Exxon’s goal is to make money, and the company has made, and continues
to make, a lot of it. For the last three months of 2009, Exxon announced
earnings of $6.05 billion, which admittedly was a decline of 23% from the
year before.40 To give these numbers more meaning, Respondents in the
Exxon Shipping case calculated that, based on Exxon’s internal rates of re-
turn, the company had earned a net of $3.9 billion on the approximately
$500 million in punitive damages from the trial court’s judgment in 1996
until July 2008.41 These are, quite simply, staggering sums of money.
Of course, a for-profit, publicly-traded corporation like Exxon has a
duty under the law to make money for its shareholders.42 What this means
is that short-term profits drive business, even for those businesses that want
to give “equal, and in some cases paramount, consideration to social and
environmental outcomes.” Take the case of Ben and Jerry’s: When Unilever
offered in 2000 to buy Ben and Jerry’s for more than what its stock was
trading at, the Board of Directors was told that it would likely face share-
holder lawsuits if it did not sell, despite concern that Unilever would not
continue Ben and Jerry’s more socially-responsible approach.43 In other
words, our economic system and the laws governing corporations urge
growth and profitability above all else.
We have identified, then, the first root of environmental degradation—
the cultural shift toward materialism, which embraced an economic system
aimed at perpetual growth with no natural limit. This fundamental shift,
which has happened over centuries, seems a good place to start in our
search for causes of environmental degradation. There are, however, more
to consider. I’ll turn now to population.
40. Ben Rooney, Exxon Profit Slides 23%, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 1, 2010, http://
money.cnn.com/2010/02/01/news/companies/Exxon_Mobil_earnings/index.htm.
41. Reply Concerning Respondents’ Submission With Respect To Rule 42.1 at 11–12, App.
C, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008) (No. 07-219), available at http://
www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/07-219_reply421.pdf.
42. See Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Social Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier,
84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 351 (2009) (“[P]roponents of corporate philanthropy and CSR generally
accept that a corporation’s core function is to produce profits to benefit its shareholders.”).
43. See Timothy McQuiston, Ben and Jerry’s: Had Fun, Made Money, VT. BUS. MAG., May
1, 2000, http://www.vermontbiz.com/article/may/ben-jerrys-had-fun-made-money (“Forced by
laws governing publicly traded companies, and a shareholder suit to enforce those fiduciary re-
sponsibilities by the board of directors, Ben & Jerry’s Homemade Inc, based in South Burlington,
accepted a whopping $43.60 per share offer from Unilever, the giant Dutch/British consumer
products company.”).
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B. Is Population Growth to Blame?
Economies are not the only things that have been in perpetual growth.
Population has also surged, particularly in the twentieth century.44 As a
result, several environmental thinkers have seen population as another root
cause of our ecological crisis.
For example, both the great writer Edward Abbey and the activist
Christopher Manes agree that there must be a fundamental change in our
society in order to remedy the current environmental problems.45 To them,
part and parcel of such a change includes, among other things, a drastic
reduction in human population in order to make room for all the species that
inhabit the earth. According to this vision, humans will return to the wilder-
ness and live on large tracts of land, separate from one another.
In particular, Abbey believes in an individual’s right to live how he
wants to live without interference from the government or other private
individuals. This right includes the right to drink from every stream without
fear of pollution.46 Manes adds a twist to this vision by describing tribal
communities living “the life of environmental modesty,” and offering these
communities as examples or “a sense of direction” as to what is possible.47
Both Abbey and Manes are willing to require a drastic reduction in human
population and impose severe limits on what one may do on the land.
The story of population as a principal source of environmental degra-
dation, however, is not quite that simple. J.R. McNeill, an environmental
historian like Worster, has documented the impacts of population growth
over the last century.48 He concludes that population growth has indeed
contributed to air and water pollution, deforestation, and soil loss.49 Far
more troubling, however, is his observation that the degradation per person
has increased and is increasing.50
In addition to population growth, McNeill explains that migration
“often mattered more than growth.” Migration took two basic forms: (1)
there was the migration of millions of peoples to ecologically unfamiliar
44. J.R. MCNEILL, SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 270 (2000).
45. See generally EDWARD ABBEY, DESERT SOLITAIRE: A SEASON IN THE WILDERNESS
(1968); CHRISTOPHER MANES, GREEN RAGE: RADICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE UNMAKING
OF CIVILIZATION 238, 240 (1990).
46. See ABBEY, supra note 45.
47. MANES, supra note 45.
48. MCNEILL, supra note 44, at 276.
49. See id. at 272–73.
50. See id.; cf. JOHN RANDOLPH & GILBERT M. MASTERS, ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABILITY:
TECHNOLOGY, PLANNING, POLICY 8–9 (2008) (noting the high rate of energy consumption in more
developed countries).
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areas,51 and (2) the migration of people to urban areas, “a crucial source of
environmental change.”52
In the end, then, there is no doubt that population growth contributes to
degradation. Degradation per person, however, is much more important
than the net population increase standing alone. Moreover, migration to un-
familiar areas as well as to cities has resulted in significant environmental
degradation.
How is this reflected in the Exxon Valdez disaster? The migration of
people to Prince William Sound does not appear to have caused significant
environmental harm to the surroundings. The area was, and remains,
sparsely populated, largely by Native Alaskans, commercial fishermen, and,
once the pipeline was constructed, people working for the pipeline.
There can be no doubt, however, that the opening of the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline changed the environment, particularly once the terminal in Valdez,
Alaska opened.53 In fact, before the pipeline was built, the environmental
impacts of the pipeline were contested by environmentalists who brought,
among other things, a challenge under the National Environmental Protec-
tion Act (NEPA)54 for the failure to consider building a pipeline through
Canada rather than shipping the oil in tankers.55 The consequence of not
considering such a route, at the very least, “made the accident more
likely.”56
In addition to the changes to the landscape brought on by a new pipe-
line and shipping center in “one of the last major unblemished wilderness
areas in the world,”57 the observation that our per capita consumption and
thus our per capita degradation has increased also is exemplified by the
Exxon Valdez spill. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline was built at a time when
Americans’ per capita oil consumption was at an all-time high.58 Indeed,
when the D.C. Circuit heard the challenge to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, it
noted that what was at stake included “billions of gallons of oil at a time
51. MCNEILL, supra note 44, at 281.
52. Id. at 282.
53. American Experience, The Alaska Pipeline: The Environmental Movement and the Oil
Industry (Apr. 4, 2006), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pipeline/peopleevents/e_environment.
html (examining a variety of alleged environmental impacts of the pipeline).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2006).
55. See Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 846–48 (1973).
56. Victor M. Sher & Carol Sue Hunting, Eroding the Landscape, Eroding the Laws: Con-
gressional Exemptions From Judicial Review of Environmental Laws, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
435, 441 (1991).
57. Wilderness Soc’y, 479 F.2d at 891.
58. See RANDOLPH & MASTERS, supra note 50, at 16. The chart indicates that oil consump-
tion reached a peak near 38 quadrillion BTUs around 1975; oil consumption in 2006 is at about 40
quadrillion BTUs. In 1975, the U.S. population was about 215 million people, see U.S. Census
Bureau, Intercensal Estimates 1970–1980, http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1980s/st7080ts.
txt; by 2006, it was near 300 million, see U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Population Estimates 2000
to 2006, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est2006.html. As such, per capita oil con-
sumption was much higher in the mid-1970s than it has been at any other time.
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when the nation faces an energy crisis of serious proportions.”59 American
consumption of oil per person today remains one of the highest of any de-
veloped country, largely because we rely on oil to power our cars and there
have been very few changes to the fuel efficiency standards over time.60
C. Where Does Science Fit In?
Conservation biologist David Ehrenfeld, like Leopold, also points the
finger at people but even more directly. Ehrenfeld argues that the funda-
mental problem we face is what he calls the religion of humanism. At its
core, this religion embraces a “supreme faith in human reason—its ability
to confront and solve the many problems that humans face, and its ability to
rearrange both the world of Nature and the affairs of men and women so
that human life will prosper.”61 The result of this approach is that humans
tend to believe that those parts of the natural world that are not known to be
useful are worthless.62
Worster, too, derides the advent of what he calls scientific materialism.
Science and technology were supposed to improve the human economic
state by “harnessing ideas to practical ends” and eventually “turning the rest
of creation into power and wealth.”63 As a result, we now have, as but one
measure, “ten thousand new chemicals introduced each year.”64
To combat this faith in human reason, Ehrenfeld advocates the adop-
tion of the “Noah Principle,” which requires humility to preserve every spe-
cies simply because it exists.65 This approach, embraced by other
conservation biologists, has similarities to the precautionary principal that is
found in many other ecological writings.66 It also echoes Leopold’s first
rule that we are not to throw away parts of nature when we do not know
what they mean to the whole: “If the biota, in the course of aeons, has built
something we like but do not understand, then who but a fool would discard
seemingly useless parts? To keep every cog and wheel is the first precau-
tion of intelligent tinkering.”67
David Orr suggests that we simply need less science and technology:
“Perhaps much of our technology is not taking us where we want to go
59. Wilderness Soc’y, 479 F.2d at 891.
60. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Demand, http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/
petroleum/analysis_publications/oil_market_basics/demand_text.htm (last visited March 28,
2010).
61. DAVID EHRENFELD, THE ARROGANCE OF HUMANISM 5 (1981).
62. Id. at 177.
63. Worster, supra note 17, at 170.
64. David Orr, The Problem of Sustainability, in ECOLOGICAL LITERACY: EDUCATION AND
THE TRANSITION TO A POSTMODERN WORLD 3, 13 (1992).
65. EHRENFELD, supra note 61, at 207–08.
66. See, e.g., Knudsen, supra note 4, at XXX.
67. ALDO LEOPOLD, ROUND RIVER: FROM THE JOURNALS OF ALDO LEOPOLD 146–47 (Luna
B. Leopold ed., 1993).
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anyway.”68 He then advises that “[m]aking life simpler, ecologically sus-
tainable, more friendly, and more conducive to human growth only requires
only a fraction of the technology now available.”69
Science and technology, then—and particularly their rapid develop-
ment over the last century with little regard for longer-term hazards—are
surely strands of another root of degradation. This root is, like population
growth and consumption related to population growth, closely tied to eco-
nomic development. It is nevertheless appropriate to note that science and
technology, and our failure to take a more cautionary approach, have
wrought great environmental damage.
With respect to the Exxon Valdez, we know that science and technol-
ogy were responsible for the advances that allowed a tanker to be filled with
fifty-three million gallons of oil and sail across an ocean, a feat that remains
mind-boggling. Even more stunning, however, was the faith that these
human-engineered and human-operated ships would not fail, and the belief
that there would be no spill the size of the Exxon Valdez spill. Yet it is clear
now that because no one anticipated or prepared for a spill of that magni-
tude, the damage was much greater.70
D. What Role Does Individualism Play?
Although it took some time to rise to predominance, by the time of the
Declaration of Independence, individualism and individual rights were on
the rise.71 This individualism, according to Eric Freyfogle, led people to
“focus . . . on personalized rather than shared visions of the good.”72 In-
deed, Freyfogle notes, personal liberty has been “exalted above all
others.”73
Once individualism took hold, “it pushed aside earlier social visions
that subordinated the individual to the good of the community.”74 The result
was that individuals began to do what they pleased and take what they
wanted without considering the good of the community. When individual-
ism is combined with the economic notion that there is no natural limit,
only perpetual growth, it constitutes another root cause of environmental
degradation.
One response to this is to take the individual rights approach and sim-
ply give nature equivalent rights. In his book The Rights of Nature,
68. Orr, supra note 64, at 15.
69. Id.
70. SKINNER & REILLY, supra note 1, at ES-1. R
71. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, JUSTICE AND THE EARTH: IMAGES FOR OUR PLANETARY SUR-
VIVAL 117–18 (1993).
72. Id. at 118.
73. Eric T. Freyfogle, Simplicity, Community, and Private Land, in VOLUNTARY SIMPLICITY
245, 247 (Samuel Alexander ed., 2009).
74. FREYFOGLE, supra note 71, at 118.
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Roderick Nash argues that extending rights to nature is the next step in our
expanding concept of rights.75 He compares the extension of rights to the
non-human world to the liberation of slaves after the Civil War, and con-
tends that to many, nature is “just the latest minority deserving a place in
the sun of the American liberal tradition.”76
Nash further recognizes that at the heart of the problem is the issue of
ownership: “The full weight of private property supported the slaveholders’
cause, just as it does that of contemporary owners of nature.”77 He therefore
argues that private ownership, “what some even call the enslavement of
nonhuman species and the environment,” must be abandoned in order to
solve our environmental problems.78
Although Nash is surely correct that affording individual rights has
resulted in great social progress over time including, importantly, progress
in the area of racial and gender discrimination, affording individual rights
may be a bad fit for the problem of environmental degradation. Instead of
giving nature individual rights, another approach is to think in more collec-
tive rights terms.79 This is the perspective offered by farmer and writer
Wendell Berry. Berry’s essay “It Wasn’t Me” elucidates his very different
vision of how we might live on the land, which emphasizes community and
stewardship.80
In this short story, Berry describes a parcel of land that is to be auc-
tioned after the death of its owner, Old Jack Beechum. Old Jack wanted a
young couple, the Penns, to have this land because they had farmed it and
taken care of it for the eight years before Old Jack’s death. Unfortunately,
in his will, Old Jack had left the farm to his daughter Clara and left what he
thought would be half the purchase price of the land to the Penns. Clara,
who was no longer a member of the local community, decided to auction
the land off to the highest bidder, despite the pleas of her father’s lawyer
and contrary to a note Old Jack had written indicating that he wanted the
Penns to have his farm. The highest bidder ended up being the Penns, but
they paid a much higher price than they could afford, even with the money
that Old Jack had left them.
In describing these events, Berry conveys the importance of commu-
nity and the obligations to past and future generations. To him, just as to
Leopold, the community includes the land and the land is intimately tied to
everything, including human-to-human relationships. Another of Berry’s
75. RODERICK F. NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
(1989).
76. Id. at 212.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 213.
79. See Freyfogle, supra note 73, at 247.
80. WENDELL BERRY, THE WILD BIRDS: SIX STORIES OF THE PORT WILLIAM MEMBERSHIP
45–73 (1985).
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characters tells Elton Penn that in addition to Old Jack, the farm chose
him.81 That same character points out that “[t]he place [, the farm,] is crying
out to us to do better, to be worthy of it.”82 The message of these images is
clear: land stewards must be carefully chosen and part of that decision will
be made by the land. Once chosen, the health of the whole will depend on
the steward listening and responding to the land. Most significantly, this
vision offers images of people living on the land, not as loners who own
large lots, but rather as members of a community.
Another way of framing this problem is the classic Tragedy of the
Commons:83
When a resource is freely available to everyone in common, eve-
ryone has an incentive to take as much of that resource as they
want, even though the collective result may be the destruction of
the resource itself. Society as a whole would be better off re-
straining consumption and preserving the resource. But the ra-
tional action for each individual is to consume to her heart’s
content.84
Individuals caught up in these commons dilemmas often are not “selfish,
shortsighted, anti-environmental, or overly focused on immediate material
gain.”85 Instead, there are certain structural barriers posed by the commons
dilemma, ones that require us to rethink our approach to these problems
altogether.
Professor Buzz Thompson has identified three such features that
“make it difficult for people locked in tragic overuse to act ‘rationally’ in
trying to come up with an acceptable solution.”86 First, he notes that the
framing of the problem as giving something up today even if it would result
in a gain in the future makes it very hard to solve.87 Second, because there
is always uncertainty, it can be difficult to convince resource users that
there is a problem at all and, even more difficult, that a collective solution
will be fair to all.88 Finally, Professor Thompson points out that sacrificing
for future generations, which is what collective solutions to resources com-
mons problems requires, is often difficult, particularly because people tend
to be overly optimistic about the future.89
81. See id. at 68.
82. Id. at 69.
83. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
84. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Com-
mons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 242 (2000).
85. Id. at 255.
86. Id. at 256.
87. See id. at 256–57.
88. See id. at 258–62.
89. See id. at 262–65.
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Given these barriers, it is clear that we do not need to “simply chang[e]
people’s environmental ethics.”90 Instead, we need to begin the hard work,
Professor Thompson argues, of framing a collective solution that addresses
the three barriers he identified. That is, we need a solution that requires
resource users to identify that there is a problem,91 and then develop solu-
tions with those resource users “that maximize the freedom of resource
users and . . . [often] involve local control of the resource,”92 as well as
allocate the burden fairly.93
When faced with thinking in collective terms like this, it might at first
appear awkward because we are accustomed to thinking about individual
liberties. Asked to imagine landscapes, though, it becomes clear that the
actions of many individuals collectively contribute to the health of an Illi-
nois stream or the air in the Salt Lake Valley.94 Likewise, individual deci-
sions to drive more miles and thus consume more oil surely contributed to
the Exxon Valdez disaster that is likely to haunt the Sound for many genera-
tions to come.95 Leaving decisions like these to individuals, or even going
so far as to describe them as rights, rather than exploring solutions framed
in community and collective terms, will only lead to further environmental
degradation.96
E. What About the Corporations?
This overview of the root causes of environmental degradation would
be incomplete if I failed to take notice of the role of corporations in this
arena. Unlike the root causes of environmental degradation that I identified
above, modern corporations are relative newcomers compared to the centu-
ries-old shifts that have been occurring. They are also, because of their later
arrival as a product of the economic structure we have created, more fairly
characterized as inhibiting our ability to halt degradation rather than an ac-
tual root cause. But make no mistake: corporations are able to limit progress
to address degradation because they occupy a privileged spot in today’s
society and wield enormous power.
Amy Sinden has already taken up the task of explaining why corpora-
tions are so powerful, particularly in the environmental arena. For one
thing, “basic and well-accepted principles of interest-group theory predict
that a group whose interests are diffuse and have less marginal impact on
each individual member will have far more difficulty organizing into an
90. Thompson, supra note 84, at 267.
91. See id. at 270–75.
92. Id. at 276.
93. See id. at 277.
94. Cf. Freyfogle, supra note 73, at 247.
95. Luczycki, supra note 2, at 28. R
96. See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75
(2010) (exploring the intersection of private property and individual liberty).
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effective pressure group than a smaller group in which each member suffers
substantial economic harm.”97 Corporations thus have an advantage in or-
ganizing and getting a message out to the public.
Moreover, when it comes to particular messages, corporations signifi-
cantly mold and limit individual market preferences.98 In fact, corporations
are so powerful when it comes to environmental outcomes that instead of
trying to make changes legislatively or through agencies, many believe
working directly with corporations is much more effective.99
Finally, “corporations tend to have far more political clout than indi-
viduals, both because they tend to be wealthier and because of the privi-
leged position they occupy in politics.”100 After the Supreme Court’s recent
ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,101 which struck
down certain prohibitions on corporate expenditures in political campaigns
opening more doors for corporations in politics, the latter portion of
Sinden’s second point is even more acute. As Justice Stevens noted in his
dissent in Citizens United, “While American democracy is imperfect, few
outside the majority of this Court would have thought its flaws included a
dearth of corporate money in politics.”102
With respect to the Exxon Valdez tragedy, the political power of the oil
companies was on full display. First, shortly after the D.C. Circuit ruled in
the environmentalists’ challenge to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline that the per-
mits granted were illegal under the Mineral Leasing Act, and although it
required Vice President Agnew to break a tie, “Congress exempted the pro-
ject from the need to comply with NEPA and precluded further court action
under other laws.”103 Second, as I discuss further below,104 when the Exxon
Valdez ran aground in 1989, oil discharges had only a few years earlier been
exempted from coverage under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act, a glaring hole that left those af-
fected by the spill to rely largely on federal maritime common law, and that
later prompted the passage of the OPA. Finally, even the Supreme Court
noted Exxon’s funding of several academic studies related to the punitive
97. Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental
Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1438 (2005) [hereinafter Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes].
98. See Amy Sinden, Climate Change and Human Rights, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL.
L. 255, 264, 269 (2007) [hereinafter Sinden, Climate Change].
99. For example, well-known alternative energy advocate Amory Lovins has been working
with Wal-Mart since 1993. Matt Sullivan, Green Guru: Wal-Mart, Pentagon, Detroit on Verge of
Big Eco-Cash, POPULAR MECHANICS, Oct. 10, 2007, http://www.popularmechanics.com/technol-
ogy/industry/4225916.html?series=37.
100. Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes, supra note 97, at 1438.
101. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
102. Id. at 979 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
103. Sher & Hunting, supra note 56, at 440.
104. See infra Part II, p. 146.
\\server05\productn\U\UST\7-1\UST107.txt unknown Seq: 16 10-MAY-10 10:48
2009] THE LEGACY OF EXXON 145
damages claims in the Exxon Shipping v. Baker case, a sure sign of Exxon’s
desire and power to influence legal results.105
Just because corporations have this kind of power does not necessarily
mean that they will degrade the environment. As discussed above, however,
corporations do degrade the environment because, in our system of eco-
nomics, degradation that lowers costs helps the bottom line.106 Moreover,
even those corporations that would prefer to be more ecologically-con-
scious have faced obstacles. Indeed, in the wake of Unilever’s buyout of
Ben and Jerry’s, many, including Jones Day lawyer R. Todd Johnson, have
called for new laws that would allow “for-benefit” corporations that would
not be driven by the financial bottom line.107 Instead, the boards of these
corporations would “balance social and environmental policies with
profit.”108
Although the fact that this option is being proposed is a sign of some
progress in recognizing flaws in American corporate law, it nevertheless
tacitly accepts that for-profit corporations are free to continue degrading the
environment to benefit their short-term bottom line. Instead of offering
companies the option of recognizing that “socially beneficial activity is ine-
luctably part of the bottom line,”109 why not require it of all companies?
At bottom, although corporations cannot be blamed as a root cause of
environmental degradation, they are in no small part responsible for perpet-
uating it. Accordingly, it is equally important to contemplate the ways in
which the power of corporations might be curbed as it is to address the root
causes of environmental degradation.
* * * *
At this point, I have explored various root causes of environmental
degradation as well as one factor that strongly inhibits any change from our
degraded state. We can put all of this together to tell a relatively straightfor-
ward story.110
Many earlier peoples respected nature and viewed themselves as part
of it.111 In a shift that took centuries to fully play out, a new worldview was
created that was “secular, progressive, and rational.”112 This cultural shift
embraced a new system of economics, one that seeks perpetual growth with
105. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2608, 2626 n.17 (2008).
106. See Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes, supra note 97, at 1409; Sinden, Climate Change, R
supra note 98, at 264, 268. R
107. See April Dembosky, Protecting Companies That Mix Profitability, Values, NPR MORN-
ING EDITION, March 9, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124468487.
108. Id.
109. Kelley, supra note 42, at 250.
110. Eric Freyfogle offers a longer and more complete version of the root causes story. See
FREYFOGLE, supra note 71, at 113–19.
111. See Worster, supra note 17, at 165–66.
112. Id. at 170.
\\server05\productn\U\UST\7-1\UST107.txt unknown Seq: 17 10-MAY-10 10:48
146 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:1
no recognition of a natural limit. This economic growth, in turn, led to pop-
ulation growth and large migrations to both cities and sensitive ecological
areas. Both of these developments have increased overall environmental
degradation, but more importantly, they increased degradation on a per per-
son basis.
The dominant economic model has also spurred on science and tech-
nology, both of which have thrown caution to the wind with respect to the
environment in the pursuit of improving the human economic condition.
Even today we remain overly optimistic in our scientific abilities and tech-
nological wherewithal to solve any and all problems.
In addition, individual rights and liberties have been promoted while
collective goals have been a clear second. Unlike other contexts like civil
rights in which individual liberties have achieved significant improvements,
unbridled individual rights in the environmental context has led to dirtier
air, water, and land.
Finally, one of the later constructs created by the perpetual growth
system is corporations, which are built to make short-term profits. These
entities benefit from the current system, and thus stand as devout protectors
of the new cultural worldview.
This is our predicament—both how we got here and why change is so
very difficult. Is there a solution? Or are we just stuck? Before turning to
those questions, I turn now to evaluate how the dominant worldview has
impacted environmental law.
II. CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
For almost forty years,113 federal environmental law—largely consist-
ing of pollution control statutes aimed at particular environmental media
(water, air, and land) and statutes aimed at protecting special places and
things—has remained unchanged in its approach and reach. As a general
matter, we can situate these federal environmental laws into four
categories.114
A. Categories of Federal Environmental Laws
First, there are pollution control by media or substance laws. These
include, among others, the Clean Water Act,115 the Clean Air Act,116
RCRA,117 CERCLA,118 and the OPA.119 One example of a media-specific
statute is the Clean Water Act. That Act prohibits the discharge of pollu-
113. An “explosion” of environmental law occurred beginning in 1970. ROBERT L.
GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 71 (5th ed. 2007).
114. Cf. Amy J. Wildermuth, Is Environmental Law a Barrier to Emerging Alternative Energy
Development?, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 509, 522–23 (2010) (framing themes of environmental law).
115. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
116. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006).
117. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006).
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tants from point sources into navigable waters unless it is permitted.120 The
OPA, on the other hand, is a substance-specific statute. It regulates dis-
charges of a specific substance, oil, into navigable waters or adjoining
shorelines or the exclusive economic zone.121
The second category of statutes are those that protect discrete re-
sources. These include statutes like the Safe Drinking Water Act,122 the
National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,123 and the Endangered Species
Act.124 The Endangered Species Act, for example, protects those species
that are listed under the Act because they are “in danger of extinction
throughout all or significant portions of their range.”125 The protections af-
forded to listed species under the Act include preventing the federal govern-
ment and private parties from harming the species in a variety of ways,
including adversely modifying the species’ habitat.126
Third, more specialized protection of discrete resources is provided by
the protection of federal lands statutes. These include, among others, the
Antiquities Act127 (the mechanism for designating National Parks and Mon-
uments), the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act,128 and
the Wilderness Act,129 as well as both FLPMA130 and NFMA.131 These
statutes dictate what can be done on public lands, and range from allowing
more limited land uses in places like National Refuges and National Parks,
to permitting a wider range of use options for National Forests and federal
lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management.132
118. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601–9675 (2006).
119. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2763 (2006).
120. 33 U.S.C. § 301(a).
121. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
122. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2006).
123. National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287 (2006).
124. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006).
125. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
126. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & DALE D. GOBLE, WILDLIFE LAW: A PRIMER 255–77 (2009).
127. Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433 (2006).
128. National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd–668ee (2006).
129. Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2006).
130. Federal Law and Policy Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (2006).
131. The National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1687 (2006).
132. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Ecosystem Services in the Klamath Basin: Battlefield Causali-
ties or the Future?, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 207, 232 (2007) (“Wildlife refuges are a cate-
gory of public land withdrawal which falls between the limited use mandates that characterize (or
once did) the national park system and the expansive, open-ended multiple use management man-
dates of withdrawals such as forests and grazing lands.”); U.S.D.A. FOREST SERVICE/NAT’L PARK
SERVICE, THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE AREA INTERAGENCY FIRE MANAGEMENT PLANNING AND
COORDINATION GUIDE 1 (2000), http://www.nps.gov/yell/parkmgmt/upload/appendixc.pdf (“Na-
tional Forests and National Parks have been managed differently, as specified in their original
Congressional mandates. National Parks were founded upon the principles of preservation, public
enjoyment, and non-interference with natural processes. National Forests were established on con-
servation principles; the wise multiple-use of natural resources.”).
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Finally, there are the procedural and information statutes, which in-
clude statutes like NEPA,133 the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act,134 the Toxic Substances Control Act,135 and FIFRA.136
NEPA, for example, requires an analysis of the environmental impact of
any federal action that will significantly affect the environment.137 The stat-
ute does not, however, require an agency to pick the “best” option for the
environment; it only requires that an agency evaluate its options in some
detail.138 In other words, “the Act is understood as controlling only how
agencies go about their decisionmaking[,] not what they actually decide to
do.”139
B. Shortcomings of Current Federal Environmental Laws
After organizing the statutes in this way, four themes emerge that illus-
trate the shortcomings of these laws.
First, it is clear that we require information to be collected and re-
ported on environmental harms but that information tends to be a measure
of only the worst stuff, those things identified as toxics.140 Information
gathering is surely a good place to start when tackling a problem and, to be
fair, most environmental statutes include information collecting and report-
ing provisions.141 These statutes have in some instances alerted us to the
presence of pollutants in the environment, as well as shed some light on
environmental decisions.142 There remain, however, wide gaps in our
knowledge of many toxic chemicals used in high volumes.143 Moreover,
information statutes are largely toothless. As noted above, NEPA is simply
a stop-and-think-about-it statute with no underlying substantive goals or
measures for ecosystem health.144
Second, we typically protect discrete resources and special places. We
have preserved a few natural special places, like National Parks, but those
are typically without human habitation.145 We have also made an effort to
133. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006).
134. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050
(2006).
135. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2006).
136. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2006).
137. ROBERT W. ADLER & DAVID M. DRIESEN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A CONCEPTUAL AND
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 330 (2007).
138. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (“[I]t is now
well-settled that NEPA itself does not impose substantive duties mandating particular results, but
simply prescribes the necessary process.”).
139. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.1, at 810 (2d ed. 1994).
140. See ADLER & DRIESEN, supra note 137, at 373–76 (discussing TSCA).
141. See id. at 377.
142. See id. at 379.
143. Id. at 375–76.
144. See supra note 138.
145. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 71, at 101 (“One of the implications of the wilderness image
is that the presence of humans in the landscape is a bad thing.”).
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preserve species from extinction under the Endangered Species Act, but
when making the decision to protect a species, we are not required to ask
what species are more important to the health of the whole ecosystem, a
critical question if we are concerned with all of the living creatures inhab-
iting a place, not just individual organisms.146 Nor have we thought much
about how we might preserve ordinary places, the places where humans live
too.147
Third, we largely separate the environment into bits and pieces rather
than looking at the whole. Pollutants found in air emissions often become
water problems or hazardous waste problems when filtered by air pollution
control equipment.148 If air emissions are instead left uncontrolled, these
pollutants might also deposit in water or on land. Moreover, we tend to
separate the work of the agencies charged with administering environmental
statutes in the same ways that the law categorizes them. The fact that these
things are interconnected is easy to miss if one simply reads the statutes.
Fourth, in addition to the separation of the pieces, these laws have a
last-minute feeling to them. Pollution statutes, for example, do not intervene
early in a commercial process or require us to consider natural limits before
proceeding to take actions that will harm the environment. Instead, they
focus largely on the end results of industrial processes, save for some
weaker pollution prevention provisions.149 In addition, consider the Endan-
gered Species Act, the best example of this last-minute phenomenon: The
law waits until literally the last minute, when a species is threatened with
extinction, before requiring that steps be taken to protect the species.150 If
we were to draw an analogy to human health, these laws appear to be per-
forming triage; they are the equivalent of an emergency response to envi-
ronmental problems, an ER or Urgent Care.
We could, of course, think of much good that has been done by these
statutes.151 On the other hand, we could find many law journal articles (not
to mention other kinds of articles) criticizing the details of these statutes.
Rather than focus on the details, my goal here is to think about the whole of
federal environmental law and how it was shaped by and still reflects our
current materialistic approach.
Returning to our root causes of environmental degradation, we can see
many of them at play in environmental law generally. First, humans are
viewed as separate from nature. The focus of many pollution-control stat-
146. See id.
147. See id. at 103 (“We need places on Earth to live and enjoy, which means that we need a
workable, sustainable vision of using the land.”).
148. See ADLER & DRIESEN, supra note 140, at 388.
149. See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 113, at 832–34.
150. See FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 126, at 241–42 (2009).
151. See, e.g., ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 85 (1993)
(reporting that “significant progress has been made in some areas” as a result of the Clean Water
Act).
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utes is human health rather than broader ecological well-being. Even those
statutes that do a better job of attempting to protect nature, rather than fo-
cusing on people, only do so in places where people do not live. Moreover,
the faith in science is clear in end-of-the-pipe solutions, where we seem to
assume that we should and will master nature.
Nowhere to be found is the impulse to think about an entire industrial
process or, for that matter, consumption generally. There is, at bottom, no
acknowledgment of any natural limits. To make this even more concrete, I
return again to the Exxon Valdez disaster.
C. The Shortcomings of Federal Environmental Law with Respect to the
Exxon Valdez Spill
In March 1989, when the Exxon Valdez ran aground, although it was
nearly twenty years since what many regarded as the environmental law
revolution, the environmental statutes provided only limited relief with re-
spect to the spill.152 In fact, only one major environmental statute, the Clean
Water Act, applied.153
Under the Clean Water Act, the federal government was authorized but
not required to clean up oil spills into waters of the United States.154 If the
government did clean up, it was entitled to recover either its costs (if the
spill was the result of willful negligence or misconduct that the owner knew
about)155 or a statutory amount based on the type of vessel.156
Private parties, however, could not recover under the Clean Water
Act.157 The oil spilled from the tanker also was not covered under CER-
CLA, the key hazardous waste cleanup statute.158 What explains this curi-
ous exclusion? William Rodgers, Jr., notes in his leading treatise that the
Act “slipped through Congress with a surprise exclusion of petroleum from
the statutory definition of ‘hazardous substance.’”159 But perhaps the better
explanation comes from Cesar Periera:
The petroleum exclusion is the result of yet another example of
oil companies successfully influencing the political process to
limit their liability for the negative environmental and health im-
152. Browne Lewis, It’s Been 4380 Days and Counting Since EXXON VALDEZ: Is It Time To
Change the Oil Pollution Act of 1990?, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 97, 101 (2001).
153. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008) (describing other federal
statutes under which the government criminally charged Exxon, which were the Refuse Act of
1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411; the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 707(a); the Ports
and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1); and the Dangerous Cargo Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 3718(b)).
154. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006).
155. Lewis, supra note 152, at 102.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 103.
158. Id. at 104.
159. RODGERS, supra note 5.
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pacts of their product. After the 1980 Presidential election, CER-
CLA supporters realized they would have little chance of passing
the Act under a Republican administration and so if the Act was
going to pass it would have to be done quickly, without much
debate, before the newly elected President Reagan took office.
Realizing that attempting to pass CERCLA without a petroleum
exception would prevent its quick passage because of oil and gas
industry opposition, authors of the bill agreed to include the ex-
ception. The compromise allowed the bill to pass with little de-
bate and before the Regan [sic] administration took over the
White House.160
Prior to the Exxon Valdez spill, then, there was very little federal envi-
ronmental law covering oil spills. The reason? Like the explanation for the
exclusion of petroleum from CERCLA, President Carter observed in 1977
that “the influence of the oil companies . . . in the legislative process, in the
Executive Branch of the government . . ., [and] in the economic structure of
our country, is enormous.”161
In other words, the economics of materialism had led to a technologi-
cally-driven, fossil-fuel based energy system that operated under the as-
sumption that there were no natural limits to what they were doing. This
created a very powerful industry, which was able to lobby for very little
regulation. As a result, although the Exxon Valdez spill caused massive en-
vironmental degradation—the spill “is widely considered the number one
spill worldwide in terms of damage to the environment”162—there was little
that the law had to say about it.
In sum, the law fell well short of the mark in terms of creating legal
regimes that might prevent a tragedy like the Exxon Valdez spill and provid-
ing relief to those affected by the spill.163 One might be tempted to think
that, when acting to correct that mistake, Congress would have done a bet-
ter job in drafting the OPA.164 The OPA, however, fares only marginally
better.
160. Cesar Periera, Protecting the “Underground Seas”: A Case for Protecting and Creating
Claims Against Oil Companies for Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Groundwater Contamina-
tion, 12 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 21 (2004) (footnotes omitted); see also Daniel L. McKay,
RCRA’s Oil Field Wastes Exemption and CERCLA’s Petroleum Exclusion: Are They Justified?,
15 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 41 (1995); Roger Armstrong, CERCLA’s Petroleum
Exclusion: Bad Policy in a Problematic Statute, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1157 (1994); James Baller,
The Petroleum Exclusion—Stronger Than Ever After Wilshire Westwood, 43 SW. L.J. 915,
918–19 (1990).
161. Armstrong, supra note 160, at 1171 n.113 (citing President: ‘Potential War Profiteering’
in Energy Crisis, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1977, at A8).
162. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Questions and Answers, http://www.evostc.state.
ak.us/facts/qanda.cfm (last visited March 14, 2010).
163. See supra note 4. R
164. Robert V. Percival, The Globalization of Environmental Law, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
451, 463 (2009).
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The OPA’s aim is to provide a solution that prevented a particular
crisis from ever happening again: massive oil spills. It erected a new liabil-
ity scheme to deter risky behavior and established new requirements for
crews and tankers aimed at preventing spills.165 It even went so far as to
include several measures directly aimed at Prince William Sound, measures
designed to protect the degraded Sound as much as to avoid a similar trag-
edy.166 Thus, the OPA, like other environmental statutes, is a narrow, end-
of-the-process kind of solution. It is aimed at protecting a particular re-
source, the seas, from a particular substance, oil.
Even without engaging in extensive substantive criticisms of the OPA
as other have,167 it is clear that the OPA is only a limited remedy, one that
suffers, just as other environmental laws do, from the failure to address the
root causes of environmental degradation. For example, the OPA is focused
on one thing in one place: oil in water. There is no consideration of the fact
that oil causes great environmental harm, particularly in water, and we
might be better off without it being shipped. There is, in other words, no
recognition of the natural limit to our environmental resources; materialism
is only interested in growth and insuring that any impediment to that growth
is minimal.168 Furthermore, the heightened standards for the construction of
tankers, such as mandatory double hulls, reflect a sense that science and
technology will again prevail, with no consideration of options short of
shipping oil through sensitive aquatic ecosystems.
Did the spill at least lessen the power of oil companies? Oil remains
excluded from CERCLA, and is only marginally covered under the Clean
Water Act. As the one act that does cover them, one would expect that the
OPA would at least require oil companies to cover the costs of an oil spill
cleanup. Most agree, however, that the OPA’s liability caps are set too low
to cover most cleanups.169 It is hard to imagine a better testament to the
tremendous power of the industry.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, there is much work left to do. We have yet to grapple with, in
any meaningful way, why (1) a tanker holding (2) fifty-three million gal-
lons of (3) oil was in (4) Prince William Sound. Engaging this inquiry will
165. See Russell V. Randle, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Its Provisions, Intent, and Effects,
21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,119, 10,132 (1991) (arguing that new operational and technological controls
were required that would “result in better trained, better tested, and unimpaired crews” as well as
better constructed tankers).
166. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2737 (2006) (“[T]ank vessels that have spilled more than 1,000,000
gallons of oil into the marine environment after March 22, 1989, are prohibited from operating on
the navigable waters of Prince William Sound, Alaska.”).
167. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 152, at 125–28 (arguing for discrete changes to OPA).
168. See Daly, supra note 29, at 100.
169. See Lewis, supra note 152, at 127. R
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require us to rethink, at a fundamental level, our materialistic worldview
and the economic system it spawned.
We will need to begin by acknowledging the limits of nature’s capital,
and realize that we are likely beyond them. When it comes to population,
we are consuming too much on a per person basis. To fix this, we may be
required to live more simply, a change that many fear but that may well
leave us as happy as we were before. We will need to begin to exercise
more caution with respect to science and technology, realizing that we
probably need far less of it than we have been led to believe. We will need
to begin to think more collectively and less individualistically when it
comes to property and the environment. And finally, we will need to design
effective mechanisms that limit the power of companies to degrade the en-
vironment themselves as well as hinder the efforts of others to improve
ecosystem health.
As we take up the exercise of addressing root causes, the law will need
to change to encourage as well as limit behaviors. In general terms, we will
need to think in longer horizons; to see the landscape as a whole and see
natural limits; and to rethink our mechanisms for allocating decision mak-
ing and power. Whether that discussion can capture Americans’ attention
without a crisis remains to be seen. Perhaps, though, the Exxon Valdez trag-
edy and the still-present oil in the Sound will continue to remind us that we
are long overdue to begin this important work.
